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THE TWELVE-PERSON FEDERAL CIVIL JURY IN EXILE
Thomas D. Rowe, Jr.*
In the mid-1990s, the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, with
Fifth Circuit Judge Patrick Higginbotham as Chair and our
honoree, Professor Ed Cooper, in the early years of his long service
as Reporter, unanimously (coincidentally, by a 12-0 vote') pro-
posed an amendment to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 48 that
would have required the seating of twelve-member juries in federal
civil trials.2 The requirement of a unanimous verdict, unless waived
by the parties, and the abolition of alternate jurors would have been
unaffected; attrition could reduce a jury's size below twelve mem-
bers, with a floor of six unless the parties consented to a verdict
rendered by a smaller jury. The Standing Committee approved the
final proposal by a wide margin,3 but the Judicial Conference re-
jected the change. 4 As a member of the Advisory Committee at the
time I was strongly persuaded that the amendment had merit and
continue to feel that way, but must admit that the chances of a re-
newed proposal being adopted seem virtually nil no matter its
merit. This brief account is, then, a lament rather than a call to
action.
The story begins with Supreme Court decisions in the early 1970s
dealing with issues of criminal-jury size and unanimity under the
Sixth Amendment, 5 followed by its 1973 ruling in Colgrove v. Battin6
that the Seventh Amendment permits juries to have as few as six
members in federal civil trials. The Battin majority cited some stud-
ies in its opinion as indicating little difference in workings of six-
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1. See ADVISORY COmMITTrEE ON CIVIL RULES, MEETING MINUTES 19 (Oct. 20-21, 1994)
[hereinafter OcT. 1994 MINUTES] (initial vote beginning proposal process).
2. See ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES, REPORT 14-15 (May 17, 1996) (final report
sending proposal forward to Standing Committee).
3. SeeJUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, SUMMARY
OF REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
13 (Sept. 1996) [hereinafter STANDING COMMITTEE REPORT] (9-2 approval with one
abstention).
4. See AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAwvERs, REPORT ON THE IMPORTANCE OF THE TWENVFE-MEM-
BER CML JURY IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 2-3 (2001) [hereinafter ACTL REPORT].
5. See, e.g., Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 406 (1972) (stating that the Sixth Amend-
ment, as incorporated to apply to states, does not forbid conviction by non-unanimous state-
court jury); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 103 (1970) (stating that the Sixth Amendment
permits six-member criminal juries in noncapital state criminal cases).
6. 413 U.S. 149, 160 (1973).
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versus twelve-person juries7 (along with other studies pointing the
other way), but the favorable studies have since been attacked as
flawed8 and the Court has been criticized for misuse of social-sci-
ence evidence.9 Considerable research and scholarship on jury size
followed, and the findings strongly indicated that twelve-person ju-
ries were superior in a perhaps surprisingly large number of ways to
smaller bodies.10
Pat Higginbotham was on top of the work on jury size and found
it persuasive."1 As far as I know, it was at least in good part at his
initiative, with Ed Cooper performing as always his invaluable role
of "lean, mean drafting machine," that the Advisory Committee be-
gan considering what ultimately became the unsuccessful proposal.
A special supplemental briefing book of leading studies on jury size
was prepared and circulated to the Committee members,' 2 some of
whom must have felt like students in an upper-class seminar on the
civil jury! Briefer summary materials were also included, along with
treatment of other topics, in the main briefing books for the meet-
ings at which we considered the proposal.
The supplemental briefing book was impressive and persuasive; I
remember our wonderful colleague, District Judge David Doty of
Minnesota, saying that he had boarded his plane in Minneapolis
opposed to the proposal but did his reading on the flight and got
off in Tucson favoring the amendment. Unfortunately, no one
whom I have asked has been able to find a copy of that tome, in
hard copy or electronic form (briefing books, even from almost
twenty years ago, are generally available on the federal courts' Web
site13 ). So my efforts to reconstruct the arguments about the propo-
sal must come from the many other sources that do remain availa-
ble and from other studies, such as a 2000-2001 report by the
7. See id. at 159 n.15.
8. See ACTL REPORT, supra note 4, at 24-25.
9. See id. at 24 & n.126.
10. See id. at 29 n.149 ("[Tihe superiority of twelve jurors over six may be one of the few
findings about juries that does emerge with convincing clarity.").
11. See STANDING COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 3, at App. B (Memorandum from Pat-
rick E. Higginbotham to Members of Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, Oct. 12, 1994 [here-
inafter Higginbotham Memo]). A particularly influential voice was that of Richard S. Arnold,
then Chief Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. See Richard S. Arnold,
Trial by Jury: The Constitutional Right to a Jury of Twelve in Civil Trials, 22 HoFSrSRA L. REv. 1
(1993).
12. See Ocr. 1994 MINUTES, supra note 1, at 17 (reference to "separate volume of read-
ings on jury size").
13. See Agenda Materials from the Rules Committee Meetings, U.S. COURTS, http://
www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/rules/archives/agenda-books.aspx (last visited Oct. 10,
2012).
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American College of Trial Lawyers making the case for the twelve-
person federal civil jury.1 4
The arguments in favor of the traditional, larger jury size are
many but largely straightforward. Perhaps most importantly, with
juries supposed to have a reasonable chance of containing a repre-
sentative cross-section of the community, the likelihood that a jury
of six will not contain any members of a significant minority group
is not just twice that for a jury of twelve but considerably higher.' 5
(It also appears that smaller juries are more likely to contain un-
representatively large numbers of minority groups.16) Lack of diver-
sity from seating a smaller jury is likely to mean less consideration
of different views and overcoming of biases. But the advantages of
larger juries are not limited to probable greater representativeness.
Studies indicate that their verdicts tend to be more reliable, consis-
tent, and moderate,' 7 and that they-by their somewhat greater
predictability-perhaps even encourage settlements.' 8 More jurors
means a greater chance of someone recalling relevant trial evi-
dence,' 9 and larger juries are less likely to be dominated by a single
assertive juror.20
The studies and briefing materials presented to the Advisory
Committee also tried to anticipate possible counterarguments. Two
of the principal ones were higher cost and the possibly higher inci-
dence of hung juries. It is undeniable that using larger juries would
be somewhat more costly; at a time when those happy to honor Ed
Cooper at an Advisory Committee meeting must themselves pay
their own way, this higher cost would be a significant problem! But
the estimates of marginal cost difference were relatively tiny, 2' and it
also appeared that the practice of putting considerable numbers of
venire panelists through voir dire at the same time meant very little
difference in time to seat ajury.22 Furthermore, the figures on hung
14. ACTL REPORT, supra note 4.
15. See AGENDA BOOK FOR MEETING OF ADVISORY COMMrITEE ON CIVIL RULES Agenda Item
V-B, at 2-3 (Oct. 22-24, 1994) [hereinafter 1994 AGENDA BOOK] (drawing on Am. BAR ASS'N,
ABA REPORT No. 129 (1990)).
16. See ACTL REPORT, supra note 4, at 27 (quoting MichaelJ. Saks, The Smaller the Jury, the
Greater the Unpredictability, 79 JUDICATURE 263, 264 (1996)).
17. See 1994 AGENDA BOOK, supra note 15, at 4 (noting as well the likely higher variability
from smaller juries in close cases).
18. See ACTL REPORT, supra note 4, at 32.
19. See, e.g., OCT. 1994 MINTrrEs, supra note 1, at 18.
20. See, e.g., id.
21. See id. (stating that this cost is well under 1 percent of the total cost of the judicial
system).
22. See Higginbotham Memo, supra note 11, at 4.
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juries indicated only a small increase in the percentage of cases
ending that way with larger juries.23
We may have fallen into the common trap of feeling that with
our immersion in the subject, we had superior knowledge and that
only those who did not have the time or inclination to learn as
much about it as we had could possibly differ. Still, any fair-minded
reader of the summarized comments on the proposal received from
sitting federal trial judges must concede that they heavily opposed it
largely on practical grounds of workability and cost (they showed
virtually no interest in more theoretical concerns such as the virtues
of civic participation); 24 practicing lawyers, bar organizations, and
academics tended to be more sympathetic. 25
A significant and unanimous voice in opposition was another Ju-
dicial Conference group, the Committee on Court Administration
and Case Management (CACM). Its succinct statement of its view
favored the flexibility of being able to seatjuries smaller than twelve
and expressed concern for the imposition of jury duty on more
members of the public. 26 It also sounded a theme heard from many
of the individual judges: since smaller juries became permissible,
some jury boxes in new federal courtrooms had been built too
small to seat twelve jurors. 27 At hearings on the proposal, I think I
resisted the temptation to ask judges making that argument
whether the courts had carpenters at their disposal, 28 but the prob-
lem did appear to have some significance in that the numbers of
courtrooms in new courthouses might have to be smaller if every
courtroom needed a twelve-person jury box.
A further point in the discussions was that actual practice often
seemed not to involve seating juries of the six-juror constitutional
and rule minimum, but rather juries of eight or ten. For us, that
seemed a reason not to oppose the change since the difference
would not be so great. That argument, of course, can be a double-
edged sword: to whatever extent twelve-person juries are better in
23. See STANDING COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 3, at 12 (summarizing Advisory Com-
mittee response to concern for increase in hung juries with larger juries).
24. See STANDING COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 3, at App. E (Prepublication Comments
and Comments After Publication).
25. See id. passim.
26. See STANDING COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 3, at App. D (Letter from Hon. Ann C.
Williams, Chair, Committee on Court Administration and Case Management, to Hon. Patrick
E. Higginbotham 2 (Dec. 21, 1994)).
27. See id.
28. But cf. ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES, MEETING MINUTES (Apr. 18-19, 1996)
(discussion of proposed Rule 48) (stating that "'[clarpentry costs' should not stand in the
way" of adopting the proposal), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPoli-
cies/niles/Minutes/cv4-1896.htm.
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their various ways than smaller ones, juries not that much smaller
may not be that much worse. 29 It was acknowledged that "[t]he
more apt comparison is between 8- and 12-person juries, not 6- and
12-person juries.."3 0 But if my reading and recollection of the studies
on which we relied are correct, those studies mostly contrasted ju-
ries of six with those of twelve. Those contrasts are striking, but to
the extent that federal civil juries have eight or ten members, they
are not the contrasts that occur in actual federal civil trials today.
Still, the advantages of larger juries (up to the traditional
twelve-no one suggests more, except some hostile critics trying to
make reductio ad absurdum arguments) are many and significant,
with very limited down sides. Solid research and argument did un-
derlie our proposal to require initial seating of a twelve-person jury.
Even without such a requirement, the same foundation supports
federal district and magistrate judges in seating larger rather than
smaller juries-to whatever extent the design of their courtrooms
and jury boxes lets them do so!
29. But they can still be significantly worse. See 1994 AGENDA BOOK, supra note 15, at 3
(citing study comparing minority representation on actual eight- and twelve-member Califor-
nia juries, which found 17 percent of twelve-member juries with zero or one black juror and
43 percent of eight-member juries with zero or one black juror).
30. Oct. 1994 MINUTES, supra note 1, at 18. But seeADvisoRY COMMIT-ME ON CwL RULES,
REPORT OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CMIL RULES TO COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE 6 (Dec. 13, 1994) (emphasizing differences between six- and twelve-person
juries).
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